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Abstract
Has financial liberalization improved the efficiency with which investment funds
are allocated to competing uses? In this paper, we address this question using
firm-level panel data from 12 developing countries. We develop a summary index
of the efficiency of investment allocation that measures whether, and to what
extent, investment funds are going to firms with a higher marginal return to
capital. We then examine the relationship between this index and various
measures of financial liberalization. The results suggest that in the majority of
cases financial reform has led to an increase in the efficiency with which
investment funds are allocated.
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1. Introduction
Since the mid-1980s several developing countries have liberalized their financial systems. This
liberalization has been characterized by greater scope granted to market forces in the
determination of interest rates and in the allocation of credit. One crucial question that needs to
be addressed is whether the financial reforms that have been implemented have led to an
improvement in the allocation of resources.
It is curious that while governments were moving away from state control toward a free
market orientation, economists were focusing their research efforts on the negative consequences
caused by informational imperfections in a market system. Financial liberalization in general
involves replacing one deeply flawed system, characterized by heavy government intervention,
with another system with different flaws. Whether these changes will improve the allocation of
savings and investment is fundamentally an empirical question.
Several studies based on cross-country aggregate data find evidence of positive effects of
various measures of financial development on growth.
1 Note that financial liberalization tends to
be accompanied by an improvement in various measures of financial depth.  At the same time,
there is no evidence that financial reform increases private savings.  Actually, in some countries
the effect may even be significantly negative.
2 All this therefore suggests that, therefore, if there
is a beneficial effect of financial reform on growth, this is not likely to go through its effect on
the quantity of saving. Moreover, cross-country growth regressions also reveal that measures of
financial development do not have a significant impact on the quantity of investment, but they
positively and significantly affect measures of total factor productivity growth.
3 So, if financial
liberalization has a positive effect on growth, the most important channel is likely to be to be the
                                                
1 Most of the studies are based on cross-sectional growth regressions  (see, for instance, King and Levine, 1993;
Levine, 1997; and Levine and Zervos, 1998), while others on pooled time series-cross sectional country level data
(see Beck, Levine and Loayza, 1999). See also Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) for evidence of a positive
effect of stock market liberalization on growth. For a different approach see Rajan and Zingales (1998) who rely on
industry-level data to show that industries with the greater need of external finance, grow faster in more financially
developed countries. Alternatively, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that firms grow at a faster rate,
relative to a benchmark growth rate that would hold in the absence of external finance, in countries with a more
developed financial system.
2 See Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan and Schiantarelli (1999).
3  See Beck, Levine and Loayza, 1999.7
effect of financial reform on the efficiency with which investment is allocated across firms and
across sectors.
4
There is very little micro evidence on the effect of financial liberalization on the
efficiency of resource allocation.
5 Using a panel of Ecuadorian firms during the 1980s, Jaramillo,
Schiantarelli and Weiss (1992) find that there was an increase in the flow of credit accruing to
technically more efficient firms after liberalization, controlling for other firms’ characteristics.
Technical efficiency is calculated using panel data estimates of a Cobb-Douglas production
function. Similar results are also obtained by Siregar (1992) for Indonesian establishments in the
1980s. Other papers based on firm level data address the related but distinct question of whether
financial constraints have been relaxed following financial liberalization (or financial
development) and find that in most, but not all cases, smaller firms have improved their access to
external resources following financial reform.
6 However, it is not obvious, without further
consideration, what effect a relaxation of financial constraints for small firms has on the
efficiency of resource allocation.
Using industry-level data, Wurgler (2000) provides evidence that, in countries with more
developed financial systems, the rate of growth in investment is more closely associated with
contemporaneous growth in value added. In the study, country-level financial development is
measured by the average size of credit and equity markets relative to GDP. More specifically,
countries with more developed financial systems both increase investment more in their growing
industries and decrease investment more in their declining industries. The emphasis of that paper
is on cross-country variation in time invariant measures of financial development and not on the
changes resulting from the process of financial reform. Finally, other papers (see Cho, 1988, for
Korea) have focused on the change in the variance of expected marginal returns to capital across
industries, as measured by an industry specific user cost of capital, before and after
liberalization. A decrease in the variance is interpreted as suggesting that liberalization facilitates
the process by which flows of capital equate returns.
                                                
4 Financial liberalization may have also contributed to faster technological progress. See King and Levine (1993).
5 See Schiantarelli, Atiyas, Caprio et al. (1994) for a more detailed review. See also Atiyas, Caprio and Hanson
(1994) and Fry (1995) for a comprehensive review of financial liberalization.
6 This is the case for Indonesia in the 1980s (see Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar, 1994), but not for Ecuador (see
Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss, 1994). See also Gelos and Werner (1999) for Mexico and Gallego and Loayza
(2000) for Chile. See also Love (2000) and Laeven (2000) for micro evidence for several countries. The former
focuses on financial development, the latter on financial reform8
Although these approaches provide useful insights on some of the consequences of
financial development or of financial reform in different countries, they do not address directly
and comprehensively the question of whether financial liberalization has resulted in a more
efficient allocation of investment funds in developing countries.
In this paper, we investigate whether financial liberalization has increased the share of
investment going to firms with a higher marginal return to capital.  To this end we develop a
summary index of the efficiency of allocation of investment. The index compares different
measures of the marginal returns of investment summed across firms in each year with the
hypothetical returns in a benchmark economy where investment funds had been allocated to
firms in proportion to their share of capital in the economy. To implement this approach, we use
firm-level panel data panel data from 12 developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. We discuss at
length the simplifying assumptions needed to construct the index, as well as its potential
drawbacks.
We then relate this index with different measures of financial liberalization based on a
careful reconstruction of the timing of liberalization measures along several dimensions of
financial development (see Laeven, 2000). The methods used range from “ocular econometrics”
to panel estimation, using the country-year specific measures of our efficiency index.  We also
control for other potential determinants of changes in the efficiency of resource allocation, such
as trade liberalization and macroeconomic/financial shocks. Finally we allow the coefficient of
financial reform to differ with country specific characteristics.
The results suggest that financial liberalization in the majority of cases leads to an
improvement in resource allocation, although there are interesting exceptions. Panel estimation
suggests that on average there is a significant positive association between measures of
liberalization and our index, which is robust to the inclusion of other controls. The econometric
evidence on the determinants of cross-country differences in the efficacy of financial reform is
less clear-cut.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the construction of the
index of efficiency we propose. In Section 3 we describe the panel data set we use, we calculate
the index for 12 developing countries, and we provide descriptive and econometric evidence on9
the relationship between the index and various measures of financial liberalization. Section 4
concludes.
2. Measuring the Efficiency in the Allocation of Investment
In assessing the effect of financial liberalization we want to see whether it succeeds in directing
resources towards those uses with higher marginal returns. This is the concept of efficiency we
focus on. In order to develop a synthetic measure of efficiency in the allocation of investment,
we first need to measure the marginal return to investment. Our index approach measures
marginal returns either by the sales to capital ratio or by the ratio of operating profits to capital.
The former is appropriate if the production function is Cobb-Douglas in capital, labor and
materials. In this case the marginal return to capital is proportional to the sales to capital ratio.
The constant of proportionality equals the product between the elasticity of output with respect
to capital and the inverse of one plus the markup of prices over marginal costs.
7 The operating
profit-based measure is an appropriate proxy for the marginal return to capital under a generic
constant return to scale production function and perfect competition in the output market. We
then estimate the total return on investment for each firm by multiplying the firm’s investment in
a particular year by one of our measures of the firm’s marginal return to investment.  We sum the
total return to investment for each firm across all firms to obtain an estimate of the total return to
investment for the economy in a particular year.
To measure the efficiency of the allocation of investment in a year, each of our estimates
of the total return on investment must be compared to a benchmark. The benchmark we use is an
estimate of total return if investment funds had been allocated to firms in proportion to their
share of capital in the economy. In every case we use the same estimates of the marginal product
of capital for each firm to estimate actual returns, and returns for the benchmark allocation. We
divide our measure of total return actually achieved by this benchmark to obtain a measure of the
efficiency with which investment funds were allocated in each year.
This approach generates two different measures of the efficiency of the allocation of
investment funds: one where sales per unit of capital is used as a measure of the marginal
product of investment, the other where operating profits per unit of capital is used as the
                                                
7  See Abel and Blanchard (1986) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) for details.10
appropriate measure. Let us assume that investment becomes productive with a one period delay.
Moreover, let us use an individual firm’s capital stock at the beginning of year t, as a fraction of
total capital for all firms at the beginning of the same year, to measure the proportion of
investment funds that the firm would receive if investment funds were assigned in the same
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where  it S  denotes firm i sales at time t,  it π  operating profits, it I  investment, and  t i K ,  beginning
of period capital. 
T
t I  and 
T
t K  represent, instead, aggregate investment and aggregate capital at
time t, respectively. Note that each unit of investment in year t increases the capital stock, and
hence generates a return, in year t+1.
There are a set of reasons that make the sales-based index preferable to the profit-based
index. First and foremost, sales are probably measured more accurately than operating profits in
balance sheets. Calculation of the latter requires a valuation of cost of goods sold, and hence of
changes in inventories of raw materials, which is a tricky exercise, particularly in inflationary
environments. Second, the sales-based measure allows for a departure from perfect competition.
However, the markup of prices over marginal costs is allowed to vary over time but not across
firms, and the departure comes at the cost of making a parametric (Cobb-Douglas) assumption
about the production function. There is a third potential problem with the profit-based measure
of efficiency. Due to unionization or efficiency wage considerations, workers may be paid more
than the reservation wage for their jobs. To the extent that the reallocation of capital induces a11
reallocation of labor, our profit measure may underestimate the gain in total surplus generated by
such a reallocation.
A final problem with using operating profits as a measure of the return to capital is that
operating profits are correlated with cash flow. Prior to financial liberalization, the correlation
between cash flow and investment may be higher than after liberalization.  Thus we would
expect the operating profit measure of the efficiency of the allocation of investment might be
biased in favor of the pre-liberalization periods.  In fact, the previous literature in this field tends
to find that financing constraints are relaxed for small establishments after financial
liberalization. For medium and large establishments there is no significant change in the severity
of constraints. However, if in spite of all this, we find that our profit-based measure of efficiency
increases after financial reform, this is a strong indication that there has been an improvement in
the allocation of resources.
Both measures of efficiency in the allocation of investment funds have common potential
drawbacks. First, we make the implicit assumption that the same marginal return to capital
applies for the same firm in a given year to all units of investment. Second, we have so far
ignored adjustment costs of investment. Given our procedure for computing the efficiency of the
allocation of investment funds, allocative efficiency would be greatest if the firm with the
highest ratio of operating profits or value added to capital were to get all the investment funds
available for a given year. However, the discrepancy due to omitting adjustment costs may not
be large. For instance, if adjustment costs are internal and additive, and take the form
() K K I b
2 ) 2 ( , the omitted term is  ( )
2 ) 2 ( K I b , which should be relatively small for a large
range of realistic values of the investment rate.
8
A third drawback is the implicit assumption that market prices reflect the social value of
outputs and inputs. Presumably, there were social, political or even economic reasons for why
governments favored particular industries or regions prior to liberalization. That bias in the
allocation of investment funds could have been (second best) socially efficient given other
distortions in the economy.  For instance, if favored industries were producing exports, and if the
currency was overvalued, then the domestic market price of their outputs would understate the
true value of their products (correct valuations would use the shadow price of foreign currency).12
Using the “wrong” exchange rate would lead the private return on investment in the export
sector to be less than the social return.  Therefore favoring export industries whose private
returns are relatively low could actually increase the social productivity of investment. Similarly,
government policies that encouraged investment with positive spillovers and discouraged
investment with negative spillovers would enhance social efficiency. Finally, governments may
want to favor particular regions in order to improve inter-regional income distribution.  Programs
of directed credit might be more efficient means of aiding those regions than would other
programs intended to reduce inter-regional income disparities such as tax holidays for
investments in economically depressed regions.  Those tax exemptions encourage vertically
integrated firms to use transfer prices to move profits into the subsidized region.  In general
programs of directed credit may be a second-best solution to problems for which the first-best
solution is not politically feasible.
A fourth problem involves interpreting differences in the allocation of capital. In
equilibrium, the marginal product of capital of a perfectly efficient economy would be the same
in all firms.  Consequently, random allocations of capital would do as well as any other
allocation.  No banking system could do better. This would be a serious problem if we were
looking at the results of a financial liberalization that had been in effect for many years.
However, we are observing the allocation of capital for the years immediately following the
implementation of financial liberalization. For financial liberalization to eventually result in an
equalization of the returns to capital across firms, it must have redirected investment funds
toward the firms where the marginal product of capital was highest. This reallocation of
investment is precisely what we are seeking to measure. In addition, even a cursory look at the
data suggests that there are great differences in the marginal revenue product of capital across
firms.
There is also a set of problems introduced by measurement error of the capital stock. It is
very difficult to get good measures of the market value of capital.  Firms reporting large levels of
capital are likely to have less capital than they actually report, and firms reporting low levels of
capital are likely to have more capital. These measurement errors bias our measures of the return
to capital in favor of firms that report low levels of capital and against firms reporting high levels
                                                                                                                                                            
8 See, for instance, Abel and Blanchard (1986), footnote 5.13
of capital. However, it is difficult to know whether financial liberalization directs the flow of
investment funds in favor of or against firms with positive or negative reporting errors. As a
result, it is not possible to determine a priori the sign of the bias this causes in the measurement
of efficiency.
3.      Empirical Results
Has financial reform lead to an improvement in the allocation of resources as measured by our
index? In order to answer this question we need firm level panel data to construct the index, and
we need to be more precise in defining the evolution of financial reform. After providing some
background on the data used, we will present a set of empirical results that provide some
answers to our central question.
3.1 The Data
Our empirical investigation is based on firm level panel data for 12 developing countries that
have introduced various measures of financial reform over the last several years: Argentina,
Brazil, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand.
The source of the firm level information is the Worldscope database, which provides balance
sheet information on publicly traded firms. The advantage of this data set is the cross-country
comparability of the accounting information. The obvious drawback is the absence of
information on non-publicly traded firms, which are on average smaller. Another limitation is
that prior to the 1990s, very little data is available for the subset of countries of interest to us.
9
 We use an unbalanced panel, but we require at least three consecutive years of
observation on each firm, and a minimum of fifteen observations (firms) for each country-year.
Moreover we have deleted outliers following the criteria summarized in the Data Appendix.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest are presented in Table A1, while the total
number of firms available for each country is reported in Table A2.
We will rely on different measures of liberalization. They are all based on analysis of the
timing of the introduction of various aspects of financial reform as discussed in Laeven (2000).
Laeven provides a dating of interest rate deregulation, reduction of entry barriers, reduction of14
reserve requirements, reduction of credit controls, privatization of state banks, and strengthening
of prudential regulation.  These measures focus on the banking sectors and correspond to the
classification also used in Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan and Schiantarelli (2000) for a smaller
subset of countries.
10  Assume we associate a dummy equal to one (zero) with the years
characterized by the more (less) liberalized regime. A first cardinal measure of liberalization is
obtained by summing the six dummies (so that the index varies between zero and six). We will
denote this measure by flit.  Another measure is meant to distinguish in a discrete fashion
country-years characterized by a more or less fully liberalized regime, versus one still
characterized by many restrictions. As in Laeven (2000) we will divide observations depending
upon whether the overall index is less than five, versus equal to five or six. This yields a
partition of the years that is similar to the one proposed by Williamson and Mahar (1998). We
will denote this dummy by Libdummy1.
          In addition, we construct a dummy variable, denoted by Libdummy2, that equals one the
year following the removal of the main restrictions on interest rates and credit allocation (the
latter in the form of directed credit or credit ceilings). This final measure enables us to focus on
the aspects of financial liberalization that are more likely to affect the allocation of investment
funds. Since in all but two countries the removal of interest rate controls precedes or is
contemporaneous with the removal of controls on credit flows, a dummy meant to capture only
the latter aspect would be almost identical to Libdummy2.
Finally, note that all these measures of liberalization focus on financial intermediaries.
All the countries in our sample have also introduced changes designed to promote the
development of stock markets. However, stock market liberalization takes place in most
countries at the end of the 1980s and in the remaining countries in the very early 1990s, while
our firm-level data set is basically limited to the 1990s. This is one of the reasons we have
focused on the liberalization measures regarding financial intermediaries. Further investigation
of the role of stock market development requires firm-level data for the 1980s as well, and this is
left for future research
                                                                                                                                                            
9 Although for some countries data are available also for the second half of the 1980s, the number of firms included
is very small.
10 Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan and Schiantarelli (2000) also include information on securities market developments
and international financial liberalization.15
3.2.     Descriptive Evidence
In this section we will present descriptive evidence on the effect of financial liberalization on the
allocation of investment. We start by plotting in Figure 1 (a through m) our efficiency index for
sales, 
S
t EI , against the financial liberalization index, flit. The vertical line in the graphs
represents the year in which both interest rate and credit controls were removed. This exercise in
“ocular econometrics” reveals some very interesting patterns. First, for a subset of countries,
Brazil, Chile, India, Pakistan and Thailand, there is a clear and positive association between
S
t EI and flit, suggesting that financial liberalization is associated with an improvement in the
allocation of resources. One caveat is in order for Chile: by the beginning of the 1990s many
aspects of financial reforms had already been implemented, so that the most informative
experiment would have been to analyze the behavior of the efficiency index over the 1980s. It is
interesting to note that the value of the index in Chile, a country with one of the most liberalized
financial systems, tends to be higher than for the other countries.
For another group of countries, there is also evidence of an improvement of the efficiency
index following the introduction of liberalization measures. This is true for Argentina, Korea and
Mexico. For instance, in Korea the index is below one (indicating an efficiency in investment
allocation actually worse than one based purely on size) in the initial years and increases above
one with the introduction of liberalization measures. However, in all these cases, there are
significant reversals in the improvement around periods of financial and currency crisis: 1995 for
Argentina, 1998 for Korea and 1994 and 1998 for Mexico, and 1998 for Brazil. Finally, for a
subset of countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the index shows no clear
trend, while it is decreasing over time for Taiwan.
11
The efficiency index based on profits, 
π
t EI , paints a picture largely similar to the one for
S
t EI . Brazil, Chile India, Pakistan and Thailand are the countries for which one observes the
clearer improvements. However, now 
π
t EI  decreases over time for Argentina and there is a
                                                
11 Schiantarelli and Weiss, with Siregar, in preliminary past research using a similar methodology to the one
proposed in this paper, found that financial liberalization did not have a positive effect on the efficiency of the
allocation of investment in Indonesia in the 1980s.  There are several reasons that could account for these results for
Indonesia.  For instance, Indonesian conglomerates, many owned by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, already had
access to overseas capital markets, which may have allowed them to circumvent the problems of a restricted16
worsening of the allocation of resources around periods of financial/currency crises in Mexico
and Korea. Again, no clear pattern emerges for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines, while the
index shows a decrease in the latter years for Taiwan.
The overall pattern described above is confirmed and made more quantitatively precise
by comparing the mean value of the index over sub-periods, defined as pre- and post-
liberalization. The results are reported in Table 1 (in part 1 for 
S
t EI  and in part 2 for 
π
t EI ). In the
first set of columns we use Libdummy1 to divide the 1990s—i.e., the pre-liberalization (post-
liberalization) period is the one for which the value of the overall index is less than five (equal to
five or more). In the second set of columns, we use Libdummy2, so that the pre-liberalization
period is the one up to and including the year in which both interest rate and credit controls are
removed.  Looking at the sales-based index, using Libdummy1, there are large and positive
increases in its mean value in the post-reform period in six countries (Argentina, Brazil, India,
Pakistan, Thailand and Korea). In three cases (Malaysia, Mexico and the Philippines) the means
are virtually unchanged. In one case (Taiwan) one observes a decrease. When the interest rate
and credit control dummy is used to partition the period, one observes an increase in the mean
value of the efficiency index for Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico and Pakistan, while there is
basically no change for Korea.  Note that for some countries, such as Chile, the difference in
mean is not available, since the major changes in the financial deregulation process had already
occurred by the beginning of the 1990s. These results are strongly supportive of an improvement
in the allocation of resources, for the majority of countries, after financial reform. The results for
the profit-based index confirm this overall pattern but are not as strong as the sales-based results.
For instance, using Libdummy2, one observes an improvement in Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan and
Thailand, but the increase is smaller than before.  Moreover, the profit-based index for India
does not reveal any noticeable change in efficiency.
3.3.     Econometric Evidence
We now provide more formal econometric evidence on the effect of financial liberalization on
the efficiency of resource allocation by utilizing the entire panel of firm-year observations. More
specifically, we regress our efficiency index on different measures of liberalization, allowing for
                                                                                                                                                            
domestic financial system. This may contribute to explain why internal financial liberalization has not generated17
country-specific constants. Results are reported in Table 2. In Part 1, column I, we regress 
S
t EI
on the Laeven (2000) index. The results are very supportive of the idea that financial
liberalization leads to an improvement in resource allocation: the coefficient of the liberalization
index is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the quantitative effects are
quite large: the coefficient estimate suggest that going from a financially repressed index (flit =
0) to a fully liberalized system (flit = 6) leads to an increase in 
S
t EI  of 19.8 percent.
12 In column
II and III, the explanatory variables are Libdummy1 and Libdummy2, respectively. The
coefficients on the liberalization dummies are positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
Again the effects are quantitatively significant. For instance, the efficiency index increases by
14.5 percent when interest rate and credit controls are relaxed. 
Table 2, Part 2 contains the results for the profit-based measure of efficiency, 
π
t EI . The
results continue to suggest that financial liberalization improves efficiency, but the effect is not
as strong and precisely estimated as the one observed using the sales based measure,
S
t EI . The
coefficients of the liberalization dummies are always positive, but somewhat smaller now. The
coefficients of flit-1 and Libdummy2 are now significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent level,
respectively, while the one for Libdummy2 is not significant. Still, the results in column I imply
that going from a completely repressed system to a fully liberalized one leads to a sizeable
increase in efficiency of 12.6 percent.
One may legitimately wonder whether what we are capturing in these regressions is not
only the effect of financial reform, but also the effect of other liberalization measures, such as
trade liberalization or changes in macroeconomic conditions. Actually, it is not obvious a priori
how trade liberalization should affect our particular measure of efficiency. Moreover, the main
steps in trade liberalization were undertaken before the period we use for estimation.
13 In many
countries, however, a decrease in trade barriers continues during the 1990s, and in at least one
country (India), trade liberalization was accompanied by internal industrial deregulation, which
can have a positive effect on the efficiency of resource allocation. In order to address these
                                                                                                                                                            
large gains.
12 If we include in the calculation of the liberalization index also a dummy for stock market liberalization, the results
are virtually unchanged. The coefficient of the liberalization remains significant and virtually unchanged.18
issues, we return to the full sample and we add to each specification the mean tariff rate as a
measure of the degree of trade barriers. The results for 
S
t EI  are reported in Table 3. Its
coefficient is negative, but not significant. Most importantly, from our point of view, the
coefficients on two of the three proxies for financial reform (flit-1 and Libdummy2) remain
positive and statistically significant, although their magnitude is now a bit smaller.
In order to check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of other explanatory
variables, we have conducted four other experiments (see Table 3 again). First, we have included
in the panel regression changes in the real exchange rate (an increase denotes an appreciation).
These variables may capture general macro instability and the effects of financial and currency
crisis that have occurred during the 1990s. Moreover, since the real exchange rate is correlated
with changes in the relative price of tradables versus non-tradables, it controls for changes in
markups that may occur unevenly in the tradable and non-tradable sectors.  Second, we have
used a different and possibly more specific measure of the existence of speculative pressure that
has resulted in currency crises in the last decade. This variable is the average of the percentage
change in the nominal exchange rate, in reserves and in the interest rate (see Eichengreen, Rose
and Wyplosz, 1995, and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996). Third, we have included as an
additional regressor the inflation rate as a general proxy for macroeconomic instability. During
periods of macroeconomic instability it may be more difficult to identify where good investment
opportunities are, and this may adversely affect the efficiency of allocation of investment funds.
14
Finally, we include GDP growth in the equation to control for the effect of business cycles on the
efficiency of resource allocation. It is not clear what the sign of the GDP growth coefficient
should be. For instance, during a recession credit risk increases and banks may become more
careful in selecting the projects to be financed. At the same time uncertainty may be greater
during a recession, making it more difficult to identify good investment opportunities.
The crucial result here is that financial liberalization continues to exert a significant
effect on the sales-based index of efficiency. Across all specifications, the coefficients of all the
proxies for financial liberalization remain significant at least at the 5 percent level in all cases
                                                                                                                                                            
13 For a review of empirical evidence of the effect of trade liberalization on growth see Edwards (1993). For more
recent analysis, see Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998) and Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001). See also Lora
(1997) for a discussion on trade liberalization in Latin America.19
but two.  Of the four additional variables, the coefficients on two of them (the measure of
speculative pressure and the inflation rate) are negative and significant, while those of the
remaining two (real appreciation and GDP growth) are insignificant. This suggests that
macroeconomic instability and financial crises are associated with a worsening of the allocation
of resources.
The robustness of the link between allocative efficiency and financial liberalization,
when we use the sales based measure of efficiency, does not carry over to the profit-based
measure of efficiency. More specifically, addition to the basic specification of the mean tariff
rate, of real depreciation, of the measure of speculative pressure, of the inflation rate or of GDP
growth, leaves the coefficient of the proxies for financial liberalization positive but insignificant
at conventional levels.
15 However, the problems associated with the profit-based measure of
efficiency suggest that more attention should be given to the results derived from the sales-based
index.
It is worth assessing the robustness of the results in other dimensions, such as estimation
methods, and the definition of the capital stock. In evaluating the effect of financial liberalization
one may want to attribute more weight to those observations in the country-year efficiency
index, when the latter is based on a larger number of firm-level observations, since in this case
efficiency is measured more accurately. This could be achieved by weighting each country-year
observation of the variables included in the regression by the square root of the number of firm-
level observations available in each year in each country. However, this means attributing, de
facto, greater weight to larger countries. In Table 4 we report the results for the weighted least
square regressions for 
S
t EI . Our conclusion is largely unchanged, with the variables capturing
liberalization exerting a positive and significant effect on the value of the efficiency index.
Moreover, one may wonder whether the results obtained so far are robust to changes in
the definition of the capital stock.  In Table 5 we report the regression results for 
S
t EI , for a
definition of the capital stock, identical to the one used in Love (2000). In this case beginning of
period capital is measured as end of period capital minus investment plus depreciation. As Love
                                                                                                                                                            
14 See Beaudry, Caglayan and Schiantarelli (2001) for an analysis of the effects of monetary uncertainty on the
allocation of investment, using a different approach.
15 Of the additional variables, inflation, the average tariff and the speculative pressure measure remain significant
and have negative signs. Results are available from the authors upon request.20
suggests, this measure may be a better measure in those years in which firms undergo mergers or
acquisitions. However, it may exacerbate measurement problems in years in which firms are
allowed to revalue their capital stock in order to take account of inflation. Although the
coefficients tend to be somewhat smaller, they remain significant for all the three measures of
financial liberalization at least at the 5 percent level, independently from whether one weights
the observations. The fundamental conclusions we have reached so far are, therefore, robust to
changes in the definition of the capital stock.
A very interesting question one may ask is whether the changes in the efficiency index
are due to an intra or inter-sectoral reallocation of investment, that is a reallocation of investment
funds between firms in the same sector or in different sectors. Our data set includes publicly
traded firms in agriculture, mineral industries, construction, manufacturing, transportation,
communication and utilities, wholesale and retail trade. Unfortunately the coverage at the
sectoral level is quite spotty and makes comparisons across time or countries a very dubious
exercise. Even for manufacturing, there is not enough information for some countries and years
to make the construction of the efficiency index meaningful. The investigation of this issue,
therefore, will have to be postponed until data sets that are richer, and with more extensive
coverage than the one used here, become available to researchers.
Finally, the descriptive evidence presented in Table 1 suggests that country-level changes
in the mean value of the efficiency index between the pre and pos- liberalization period differs
across countries. This could occur for many reasons. First, factors besides financial liberalization
affect the efficiency of resource allocations. Second, the intensity of the liberalization measures
may differ across countries, and this is not fully captured by our index. Third, the effect of
financial liberalization may differ depending upon initial conditions, upon other liberalization
measures, and upon the macro context and the general institutional environment in which it takes
place. The results presented in Table 4 have already suggested that measures of speculative
pressure and of macro instability (such as the inflation rate) have an independent adverse effect
on the allocation of investment. We have also experimented with interacting all the additional
variables included in Table 3 (average tariffs,
16 change in the real exchange rate, speculative
pressure, inflation, and GDP growth) with our measures of financial reform, but the interaction21
terms are never significant.
  We have also experimented with introducing interactions of the
liberalization measures with measures of dispersion of the macro variables over the period used
for estimation. Again we have not had much success.
Moreover, we have investigated whether the effectiveness of financial reform depends
upon initial conditions and other variables that reflect institutional quality and political stability.
For instance, one may think that the effect of financial reform may be more beneficial in
countries with a well-developed legal system that affords better protection to creditor rights. For
this reason we have interacted our liberalization measures with the initial level of financial
development, initial GDP per capita, and several institutional variables, such as rule of law,
creditor rights, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, efficiency of the judiciary,
country of origin of the legal system, quality of accounting standards, measures of supervisory
power and quality, corruption, and political risk.
17
Again, it is difficult to find statistically significant differences in the financial
liberalization coefficients, due probably to the limited number of countries in our sample.  The
only statistically significant interaction is the one with the measure of official supervisory power
over financial intermediaries from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a).
18 Results are reported in
Table 6. A greater degree of supervisory power is associated with a stronger effect of financial
liberalization, and the differences are economically significant. At low levels of supervision the
effect of financial liberalization is basically zero, while it becomes large and positive at mean
levels of supervision (or higher). Finally, we also report the regression results when the effect of
financial reform is allowed to differ between countries with legal systems based on the English
system and those based on other systems. The coefficient of financial liberalization is twice as
large for the former and more precisely determined (0.043 versus 0.022, with a t-ratio equal to
2.39 and 1.16, respectively). This is consistent with the contention that protection of investors’
rights tends to be better in the English common law system (see La Porta, Lopez de Silanes,
                                                                                                                                                            
16 On the issue of the sequencing of reforms see, for instance, McKinnon (1991). See also Arteta, Eichengreen and
Wyplosz (2001) for growth regression results.
17 See La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997 and 1998) on the relationship between institutions and
finance. Note that all the institutional variables we use are country specific, but time invariant, and that all our
regressions contain country-specific constants.
18 The data in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) reflect the situation at the end of the 1990s. The measure of official
supervisory power varies in our sample between nine and fifteen. See also Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001b) for an
analysis of the effects of regulation and supervision.22
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). However, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients
are identical. This is also the case when more direct measures of property right protection,
creditor right protection, etc. are used.
4. Conclusions
The results presented in this paper provide empirical support for the idea that financial
liberalization has led to an improvement in the efficiency with which investment funds have
been allocated. Both the informal “ocular econometric” exercise and the comparison of mean
values of our efficiency index in the pre- and post- liberalization regimes suggests that the index
has improved for many (although not for all) countries, following the introduction of financial
reform. Moreover, the econometric results on the panel of country-years observations strongly
supports a positive, significant and sizeable effect of financial liberalization on the efficiency
with which investment funds are allocated. These conclusions hold for different measures of
marginal returns and financial liberalization, although they are stronger when returns are
assumed to be proportional to the sales to capital ratio. Moreover, the results for the sales-based
index are robust to the inclusion of other potential determinants of the efficiency of resource
allocation, such as trade liberalization, and macro or financial stability.
We have also found evidence that there is a negative relationship between efficiency of
investment allocation, on the one hand, and inflation and speculative pressure, on the other.
There is also evidence that its efficacy is enhanced by greater official supervisory power, and
some indication that the effects may be greater in countries whose legal system is based on
English common law. However, the statistical significance of the interaction terms with various
measure of institutional quality tends to be weak
Obviously more works needs to be done. Extending the number of developing countries
included in the analysis would obviously be useful. Moreover, one could gain additional insights
on this issue by conducting a similar analysis on larger data sets for individual countries that also
contain observations on smaller establishments. The use of larger data sets would allow one to
assess more fully whether the improvement in the efficiency in the allocation of investment
funds is due to an intra-industry or inter-industry reallocation. The main difficulty in pursuing
these extensions is the lack of good quality, firm level data, over long enough periods. Still, the23
evidence presented here provides the first comprehensive micro-based answer concerning the




t K : Beginning of period capital stock, measured as the lagged value of end of period value
of property plant and equipment, net of depreciation.
t I : Capital expenditure.
t S : Gross sales and other operating revenue during the period, less discounts, returns and
allowances.
cogst: cost of goods sold.
t π : operating profits =  t S - cogst.
Country level variables
flit : Financial liberalization index, based on Laeven (2000); see Table 1 his Appendix and
Annex 1. It is calculated as the sum of zero-one dummies representing six dimensions of
liberalization  (interest rate deregulation, reduction of entry barriers, reduction of reserve
requirements, reduction of credit controls, privatization of state banks, strengthening of
prudential regulation). One (zero) denotes the post (pre) reform regime.
libdummy1: A dummy variable that equals one (zero), when flit equals or exceeds five (is less
than five).
libdummy2: A dummy variable that equals one in the year following the introduction of
interest rate liberalization and the removal of credit controls. It is zero otherwise.25
Average Tariff: Unweighted average of tariff rates. Source: World Bank, World Development
Indicators.
∆Real exchange rate: domestic prices divided by US prices multiplied by the exchange
 rate (in units of domestic currency per US Dollar). Source:
 International Financial Statistics.
Inflation: log (1+CPI inflation rate). Source: International Financial Statistics.
Real GDP Growth: Real GDP growth rate. Source: World Development Indicators.
Supervision: Measure of official supervisory power. Source: Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a).
Speculative pressure: Average of exchange rate depreciation, real interest rate variation
and the negative of the variation in international reserves. Source: Eichengreen,
Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).26
Sample Selection Criteria
We deleted the following observations:
•  Financial sector firms, that is firms with SIC codes 60 and higher.
•  Years with fewer than 15 firms
•  Firms with fewer than 3 years of observations.
•  Observations without investment, capital stock, profits or sales data.
•  Observations with I ≤ 0
•  Observations with S/K ≤ 0
•  Observations with K ≤ 0
•  Observations with cost of goods sold ≤ 0
•  Observations where S/K >20
•  Observations where Cost of goods sold > 20
•  Observations where I/K > 2.5
•  Observations where Profits/K > 5
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
I/K 9495 0.257 0.164 0.294 0.000 2.482
S/K 9495 2.988 1.934 3.082 0.000 19.968
Profits/K 9495 0.654 0.434 0.715 -2.925 5.00027






















 Total number of firms excluding those with SIC codes greater
than 60.
b
 Firms with SIC codes between 20 and 50.28
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Tables
Table 1 : Differences in Mean Value of EI
s and EI
π













S[Index Based on Sales]
Argentina 0.996 1.105 0.109 0.996 1.105 0.109
Brazil 1.072 1.357 0.285 0.964 1.323 0.359
Chile
India 1.072 1.247 0.175 1.101 1.261 0.159
Indonesia
Korea 0.985 1.033 0.048 1.000 1.005 0.005
Malaysia 1.096 1.064 -0.032 1.213 1.056 -0.157
Mexico 1.208 1.185 -0.023 1.050 1.211 0.160
Pakistan 0.859 1.077 0.217 0.886 0.968 0.081
Philippines 1.071 1.063 -0.008 0.000
Taiwan
Thailand 0.973 1.174 0.202 0.883 1.137 0.254
Part 2: EI
π
[Index Based on Profits]
Argentina 1.124 1.063 -0.061 1.124 1.063 -0.061
Brazil 1.061 1.273 0.212 0.972 1.256 0.284
Chile
India 1.056 1.080 0.024 1.064 1.073 0.008
Indonesia 0.941 1.116 0.175
Korea 1.074 1.040 -0.034 1.082 0.996 -0.086
Malaysia 1.046 1.017 -0.029 1.031 1.027 -0.004
Mexico 1.292 1.165 -0.127 1.147 1.203 0.056
Pakistan 0.817 1.045 0.227 0.848 0.927 0.079
Philippines 1.121 1.137 0.016
Taiwan
Thailand 0.938 1.182 0.244 0.880 1.120 0.239
Country
Notes:
 a Libdummy1 = 1 (0) when at least 5 of the following requirements were met (not met): interest rate deregulation, entry barriers removed, 
reserve requirements reduced, credit controls eliminated, privatization, prudential regulation adopted.
 b Libdummy2 = 1 starting from the year after  
the liberalization of interest rates and the removal of credit controls (0 otherwise). Source:Laeven( 2000).33
Table 2: Panel Regression for EI
s and EI
π: Basic Specification 
a
Part 1: Dependent Variable: EI











R2 0.33 0.32 0.34
Obs 90 90 90
Part 2: Dependent Variable: EI











R2 0.35 0.34 0.34
Obs 90 90 90
Notes:
 a i) All specifications include country dummies; ii) Standard errors reported in italics ; iii) *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
b Source: Laeven(2000)
. c Libdummy1 = 1 
(0) when at least 5 of the following requirements were met (not met): interest rate deregulation, entry 
barriers removed, reserve requirements reduced, credit controls eliminated, privatization, prudential 
regulation adopted. Source: Laeven(2000).
d Libdummy2 = 1 starting from the year after  the liberalization 
of interest rates and the removal of credit controls (0 otherwise). Source:Laeven( 2000).34
Table 3 : Panel Regression for EI
S:
Controlling for Trade Liberalization, Real Exchange Rate Changes, Speculative Pressure,
Inflation and GDP Growth
a
Dependent Variable: EI
S [Index based on sales].
II I I I II VV
FLI (t-1)
b 0.028 ** 0.035 *** 0.032 ** 0.029 ** 0.034 ***
















R2 0.37 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.37
Obs 83 80 80 83 83
Libdummy1
h 0.070 0.102 ** 0.098 ** 0.083 ** 0.095 **
















R2 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.35
Obs 83 80 80 83 83
Libdummy2
i 0.110 ** 0.118 ** 0.106 ** 0.093 * 0.134 **
















R2 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.38
Obs 83 80 80 83 83
Notes:
a i) All specifications include country dummies; ii) Standard errors reported in italics; iii) *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 
* Significant at 10%. 
b Source: Laeven(2000)
. c Average import tariff. Source: World Bank WDI. 
d Depreciation of real exchange rate 
against US dollar (Negative values=depreciation). Source:IFS/IMF. 
e Speculative pressure index equal to average of changes in nominal 
exchange rate, changes in the interest rate and the negative of changes in international reserves. Source: Sachs et al. (1996).
 f Inflation 
is defined as the rate of change of CPI. Source: IFS/IMF. 
g GDP growth is defined as the rate of change of real GDP. Source:WDI/World 
Bank. 
h Libdummy1 = 1 (0) when at least 5 of the following requirements were met (not met): interest rate deregulation, entry barriers 
removed, reserve requirements reduced, credit controls eliminated, privatization, prudential regulation adopted. Source: Laeven(2000).i 
Libdummy2 = 1 starting from the year after  the liberalization of interest rates and the removal of credit controls (0 otherwise). 
Source:Laeven ( 2000) .35
Table 4: Panel Regression for EI
S: Weighted Least Squares
a
Table 5: Panel Regression for EI
s: Alternative definition of the capital stock 
a
Dependent Variable: EI
S [Index based on sales].
Part 1: Unweighted










R2 0.57 0.58 0.58
Obs 90 90 90
Part 2: Weighted










R2 0.54 0.55 0.53
Obs 90 90 90
Notes:
 a i) All specifications include country dummies; ii) Standard errors reported in 
italics; iii) *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%;iv) The 
square root of the number of firms in each country-year is used as weight; v) The 
capital stock is defined as in Love(2000). 
b Source: Laeven(2000)
. c Libdummy1 = 1 
(0) when at least 5 of the following requirements were met (not met): interest rate 
deregulation, entry barriers removed, reserve requirements reduced, credit controls 
eliminated, privatization, prudential regulation adopted. Source: Laeven(2000).
d 
Libdummy2 = 1 starting from the year after  the liberalization of interest rates and the 
removal of credit controls (0 otherwise). Source:Laeven( 2000) 
.
Dependent Variable: EI
S [Index based on sales].










R2 0.40 0.38 0.04
Obs 90 90 90
Notes:
 a i) All specifications include country dummies; ii) Standard errors reported in 
italics ; iii) *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%; iv) The 
square root of the number of firms in each country-year is used as weight. 
b Source: 
Laeven(2000)
. c Libdummy1 = 1 (0) when at least 5 of the following requirements 
were met (not met): interest rate deregulation, entry barriers removed, reserve 
requirements reduced, credit controls eliminated, privatization, prudential regulation 
adopted. Source: Laeven(2000).
d Libdummy2 = 1 starting from the year after  the 
liberalization of interest rates and the removal of credit controls (0 otherwise). 
Source:Laeven( 2000).36
Table 6: Panel Regression for EI
S:
 Interactions with, Supervisory Power
 and Legal Origin
a
Dependent Variable: EI

















 a i) All specifications include country dummies; ii) Standard errors 
reported in italics; iii) *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * 
Significant at 10%; iv) The square root of the number of firms in each 
country-year is used as weight. 
b Source: Laeven(2000)
. c Supervisor 
power. Source Caprio (et.al) 2001. 
d Legal origin of country. Source: La 
Porta et al.(1998).37
Figures
Figure 1. Efficiency Index Based on Sales (IE
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Figure 1(cont.). Efficiency Index Based on Sales (IE
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Figure 2. Efficiency Index Based on Profits (IE
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Figure 2(cont.): Efficiency Index Based on Profits (IE
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